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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 03-2597
                        
SAMMI D. WRIGHT,
                              Appellant
   v.
BEULAH HADRICK;
CHARLEEN SAZBO;
SCOTT SHREVE;
RAY KENT
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-01657)
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on
January 13, 2004
Before:  SLOVITER, RENDELL, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed February 10, 2004)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
1 The District Court referred to the motion in passing as one for judgment on the
pleadings rather than one for failure to state a claim.  However, because the Court relied
solely on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in its analysis, we review the dismissal on grounds of
failure to state a claim.
2 In addition to the First Amendment claim, the original complaint included
allegations of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment violations involving racial
harassment as well as a claim of state law intentional interference with a contractual
relationship.  The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims in
September 2001.  Wright did not appeal this dismissal.
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Sammi D. Wright appeals from an order entered in the District Court granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss her First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1  Wright argues that this Court should entertain a damages claim for this
alleged violation of her free speech rights.  Because this remedy is expressly forbidden by
clear precedent, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), we will affirm.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District Court’s ruling on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235
F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000).
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
analysis.  Wright alleges that her supervisors at a federal veterans hospital unlawfully
discharged her in retaliation for a letter she wrote to her senator, complaining about
conditions for veterans at the hospital.  In September 2000, Wright filed a First
Amendment retaliation claim with the District Court based on this allegation.2   In May
3 Pub.L. 95-454 (codified at various sections of Title 5 U.S.C.).  The CSRA
affords remedies for federal civil servants challenging allegedly unlawful employment
practices.
4 We have considered Wright’s two other contentions 1) that she is entitled to
receive a judgment for damages in this Court because prior settlement agreements
between the parties state that any damages related to the settlements may be paid in other
forums; and 2) that the Defendants waived their right to rely on Bush because they raised
it too late below.  With regard to the first contention, of course, parties may not stipulate a
right of action or a remedy where it is otherwise prohibited by Congress.  The second
contention lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion, because the Defendants
2003, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim, relying on
Bush.
In Bush, the Supreme Court held that where a federal employee claims his or her
First Amendment rights have been violated by a superior, and where the employee is
protected by an “elaborate” and “comprehensive” scheme such as the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”),3 courts must decline to augment such an Act by
“creat[ing] . . . a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.”  Bush, 462
U.S. at 388, 390.  Following Bush, our Court, in Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30 (3d Cir.
1995), clearly acknowledged that the CSRA provides the sole remedy for damage claims
brought by federal employees who are subject to its protections.  Id. at 35.  We added,
however, that where such employees seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief for alleged
violations of their constitutional rights, courts may still entertain the claim.  Id. at 36. 
First, Wright argues that we should stretch Mitchum to reach cases where damages
are sought by federal employees.  Second, and alternatively, Wright argues that Bush is
unconstitutional and should be overruled.4
raised an objection based on Bush even before the District Court wrote its opinion
dismissing the First Amendment claim.  Therefore, these contentions are without merit.
It is undisputed that Wright is a federal employee who enjoys the protections
afforded by the CSRA.  Therefore, it seems clear that Bush controls and that Wright is
precluded from raising a damages claim here.  Nevertheless, Wright puts forth a
perplexing argument that we should broaden Mitchum so that it will apply to federal
employees’ actions for damages.  Clearly, this is impossible because doing so would
directly contradict the holding in Bush.  Alternatively, Wright urges us to declare Bush
unconstitutional and to overrule it.  Quite obviously, however, we are not authorized to
overturn a Supreme Court decision.  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted).  
Therefore, because the District Court correctly granted the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, we will affirm.
